Judge Posner repeats in his March 19 op-ed commentary "Time to Rethink the FBI" his now longstanding criticism of the bureau as an organization that has failed to transform in taking on an expanded intelligence mission. He says we have not made enough progress. He says we are gathering information to obtain convictions and without regard to our responsibilities as an intelligence agency. He says we need a separate intelligence service in this country, and he critiques virtually every aspect of the bureau in arguing that we cannot accommodate an intelligence program within the FBI.

I joined the CIA in 1985 as an analyst, and I left on loan to the FBI, to become second-in-charge of the National Security Branch responsible for this intelligence transformation, in September 2005. I watched counterterrorism operations for years; my most recent position at CIA was as second-in-charge of the Counterterrorist Center. There are many more important things we do beyond watching our critics comment on the FBI in the media, but few things in my 19 months at the bureau have been as curious as the broad gap between perceptions of the bureau among some critics, including Judge Posner, and the reality I have witnessed during my time here.

Judge Posner's comments fall short, well short, in two fundamental areas: facts and analysis. He is dead wrong on both fronts.

First, the facts. Judge Posner points to FBI investigations as law enforcement measures that are not intelligence operations. This is incorrect. We have discussions at least once a day with Director Mueller and senior operational managers to discuss the most significant terrorist threats we see. No discussion has ever focused solely on a prosecution or on a need to compile evidence quickly for a courtroom. Every discussion I've seen focuses on how much we understand al Qaeda and its homegrown cells.

Terrorism is not about stopping plots. We can stop plots, and do, with our partners in foreign security services, at CIA, at Homeland Security, with state and local police, and with Americans who help. But terrorists will plot again if we defend against only their schemes and fail to stop the terrorists themselves. So our focus is on what to do about terrorists once we draw an intelligence picture of who they are and what they are up to. When intelligence groups use their unique tools to stop terrorists overseas, they disrupt unilaterally and sometimes with foreign partners, often using those partners' law enforcement tools to take terrorists off the streets. But the end of their often brilliant intelligence operations is disruption: stopping people so they cannot plot again.

We operate within the U.S., and we have a different set of tools. But we have the same end as they do: disruption. Once we fully understand a cell, we can either let it run, which we often do, or take it down. When we take it down, we use tools that reflect American laws, used in ways that reflect American values. We penetrate cells to develop a sufficient understanding of who they are so we can limit the prospects of surprise. And once we have that understanding, we do what our partners do: We disrupt that cell using the tools at our disposal. Any security service around the world—MI5, CIA, Shin Bet—operates using this model.

Judge Posner's arguments are equally flawed when one actually examines how our foreign intelligence partners operate. He argues for an MI5, a separate security service that has only domestic intelligence responsibilities. It is not clear to me why such an approach would be any better than what we have. In fact, I believe it would be fundamentally worse. First, when our sister security services overseas operate, they do not function independently. They operate jointly, with their police counterparts. They may run parallel informant networks at the same time, keeping one network focused on intelligence collection while another might include an informant who can appear in a courtroom. We have the luxury, in this country, of a more efficient approach: We can sit at the table, in one organization, and talk about the intelligence we are collecting and what we should do about it, whether we should continue collecting or disrupt, and what options we have under either scenario.

The FBI is a national security agency; we are not solely a law enforcement agency. Judge Posner is right—we are not and never will be solely an intelligence agency. We are the federal agency responsible for national security, combining the authority and capability to collect information that could pre-empt a threat and to do something about it. Dividing these combined responsibilities by creating yet another federal agency, an MI5, would be remarkably inefficient and terribly slow. Who would divide the tactical responsibilities that overlap and snag? Why should one agency manage intelligence sources on Hezbollah and another manage sources who provide the same information but can appear in a court of law? Who would police turf wars? And how many more resources would we have to expend to fund and staff an agency dedicated to collecting the intelligence we already collect at the FBI? Such a move would be not only inefficient but foolish.

We have had remarkable success collecting against organized crime families, for example, so we could understand their structures and then take them down in what was a remarkable intelligence success. More recently, we've hired over a thousand more analysts, trained agents in intelligence collection programs, added national security training for all agents, and expanded guidance to FBI field offices on how we should conduct our intelligence mission. And we've shifted massive resources into counterterrorism and counterintelligence and made commensurate advances in our relationships with state and local law enforcement, tripling the number of joint terrorism task forces.

But we also have a ways to go to evolve our intelligence mission. Once we do, we should determine how to get even better. We don't train our personnel well enough yet, though we are working closely with intelligence partners to do so. We continue to devise policies for guidance in collecting intelligence. I joined the bureau with questions: Can we do this? Will we do this? And how? Nineteen months later, these questions are answered. It is the responsibility of those of us leading this bureau to provide the guidance, tools, funding, and vision to accomplish this mission. Judge Posner fails to understand what we have done, who we are, and how we go about our mission. He simply doesn't know.

John P. Mudd
Deputy Director
FBI's National Security Branch
Washington

STATEMENT OF JUSTICE DEPARTMENT SPOKESMAN DEAN BOYD REGARDING
THE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL'S REPORT ON TERRORISM STATISTICS

“The Justice Department agrees fully with the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) that the Department must collect, verify, and maintain accurate statistics on the important national security work being conducted at Main Justice, the FBI, and in United States Attorney’s Offices around the country. Today, almost all the internal controls recommended by the OIG already exist to ensure the tightest possible process for gathering, verifying, and reporting terrorism-related statistics.

It is noteworthy that the OIG found that the statistics compiled by the Department’s Criminal Division (Counterterrorism Section) either accurately stated or understated the Department’s terrorism-related performance in nearly all categories. The Department has routinely used these statistics (and not the others examined by the OIG) in its public statements about the Department’s accomplishments in combating terrorism.

Immediately after the 9/11 attacks, the Justice Department and FBI launched substantial reorganizations and placed unprecedented focus on preventing future terrorist attacks, which strained internal systems designed to capture performance data. Those strains were reflected in Fiscal Years 2002 through 2004, which were the focus of the OIG’s review. Since that time, the Justice Department and the FBI have substantially improved the systems and internal controls related to terrorism case reporting.

With regard to statistics from the Executive Office for U.S. Attorneys (EOUSA) -- which are primarily used in determining resource allocation -- the OIG’s findings stem largely from its own interpretation of what the “anti-terrorism” program category code should encompass. Many cases coded by EOUSA as “anti-terrorism” are part of proactive initiatives designed to prevent terrorism by reducing vulnerabilities in critical facilities and systems nationwide. While such cases often result in convictions for other crimes, their underlying purpose is to prevent and deter terrorist infiltration of these facilities. Although the OIG argued that these cases should not be placed under the “anti-terrorism” code, the Department must be able to assess the scope of this critical work, which notably is coded separately from international and domestic terrorism cases. To avoid future concern, the EOUSA will rename its anti-terrorism category code and further clarify its definition.

For its part, the FBI has made dramatic improvements to its statistical reporting systems in recent years, specifically its case management and supporting information technology programs. Many of the weaknesses identified in the OIG report occurred during, and were an outgrowth of, the agency’s wholesale reorganization after 9/11. Today, the FBI’s internal controls over terrorism statistics are far superior to the controls that existed in the period on which the OIG focused.

In summary, the Department agrees that rigorous internal controls enhance its ability to substantiate terrorism-related performance data, and, with few exceptions, the Department has already implemented the controls recommended by the OIG.”

Washington, D.C. - The FBI announced today it has awarded the contract with Raytheon Company for the development of the Law Enforcement National Data Exchange (N-DEx). This program is a Department of Justice effort to bring together federal agents and state and local officers in a secure system to improve the efficiency of investigations.

FBI Chief Information Officer (CIO) Zalmai Azmi said, “The development and deployment of N-DEx will provide nationwide capability to share information derived from incident, arrest and event reports. This will expedite coordination across law enforcement so that we can remain one step ahead of the criminals and terrorist despite jurisdictional boundaries.”

N-DEx will allow for the sharing of complete, accurate, timely and useful criminal justice information across jurisdictional boundaries and will provide new investigative tools that enhance the nation’s ability to fight crime and terrorism. N-DEx will enable law enforcement agencies to collaborate with one another by connecting the dots between seemingly unrelated criminal incidents. In addition, it will provide contact information and collaboration tools for law enforcement agencies that are working on cases of mutual interest that span across the nation.

N-DEx will leverage the existing data contained in the FBI’s Criminal Justice Information Services (CJIS) Division systems, as well as law enforcement information maintained by local, state, tribal, and federal agencies. At a minimum, federal information in N-DEx will be contributed by ATF, DEA, Bureau of Prisons, FBI and US Marshals. N-DEx will not supplant the need for, or use of, any existing CJIS systems or their governance.

N- DEx is part of FBI’s National Information Sharing Strategy (NISS) which is strategically aligned with other key information sharing initiatives such as the Information Sharing Environment (ISE) mandated by Congress in late 2004. N-DEx is a key part of the Department of Justice’s (DOJ) Law Enforcement Information Sharing Program (LEISP) strategy, which was completed in December of 2005. The DOJ LEISP strategy includes a DOJ-wide technology architecture and standards to enable streamlined sharing of data within the Department and with other partners.

The project is an important collaboration with the CJIS Advisory Policy Board, which includes representatives from criminal justice agencies throughout the nation, including national security. Furthermore, representing the leadership of the nation’s law enforcement community, the International Association of Chiefs of Police, the Major Cities Chiefs of Police, the National Sheriffs’ Association, and the Major County Sheriffs’ Association have worked closely with the FBI and DOJ in the planning and requirements for N-DEx . As the system becomes operational, the concept of nationally coordinated law enforcement information sharing will become a reality through the N-DEx project.

The solicitation for the N-DEx performance based contract used the National Institutes of Health government-wide contracting vehicle. A thorough evaluation process was conducted based on factors including prior experience with successful development of similar projects, technical and management approaches, security, and cost.

WASHINGTON, D.C. -- The Department of Homeland Security’s Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) is seeking applicants who wish to be considered by the FEMA Administrator to sit on the National Advisory Council.

The Council is being created as an advisory role to the FEMA Administrator to help ensure effective and ongoing coordination of the federal preparedness, protection, response, recovery and mitigation for natural disasters, acts of terrorism, and other man-made disasters. Specifically, the Council will focus attention on the development and revision of the national preparedness goal, the national preparedness system, the National Incident Management System, the National Response Plan, and other related plans and strategies.

Individuals seeking to be considered for an appointment on the Council should submit a resume detailing their experience in the arena of emergency management and related fields. Resumes must be received by FEMA by March 9, 2007, and could be sent via e-mail to:

john.sharetts-sullivan@dhs.gov

Or via Mail to:
FEMA
Attention: John Sharetts-Sullivan
500 C Street, SW
Room 316
Washington, DC 20472

The development of the National Advisory Council was set into motion by the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006. The Federal Register notice posted on February 7, 2007, establishes the Council and requests applications for membership.

FEMA manages federal response and recovery efforts following any national incident. FEMA also initiates mitigation activities, works with state and local emergency managers, and manages the National Flood Insurance Program. FEMA became part of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security on March 1, 2003.

(HOUSTON) A United States citizen has been arrested and charged with receiving training from a foreign terrorist organization and conspiring to use an explosive device outside the United States, Don DeGabrielle, United States Attorney for the Southern District of Texas; Kenneth L. Wainstein, Assistant Attorney General for the National Security Division of the Department of Justice; and Joseph Billy, Assistant Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation Counterterrorism Division, announced today.

Daniel Joseph Maldonado, a.k.a Daniel Aljughaifi, 28, a former Houston resident, was returned to the United States late last evening from Kenya to face the criminal charges pending in this district. Maldonado was captured by the Kenyan military on January 21, 2007, as he fled to avoid Ethiopian and Somalian forces. Expelled by Kenyan officials, Maldonado was turned over to American authorities over the weekend and flown to Houston accompanied by special agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. He appeared before United States Magistrate Judge Calvin Botley this afternoon and has been ordered detained without bond pending a detention hearing set for Tuesday, February 20, at 2:00 p.m.

"Any who seek to aid terrorists in their mission to threaten our national security will be held to account for such serious criminal conduct," said United States Attorney Don DeGabrielle.

"This case represents the first criminal prosecution of an American suspected of joining forces with Islamic extremist fighters in Somalia. The prosecution of Mr. Maldonado demonstrates the scope of our laws and serves as a warning to others who would travel overseas to wage violent jihad," said Kenneth L. Wainstein, Assistant Attorney General for the Justice Department's National Security Division.

Joseph Billy, Assistant Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation Counterterrorism Division, said, "The FBI is working closely with our law enforcement and intelligence community partners in this country and around the world to bring all necessary resources to bear to protect Americans and its allies from terrorist attacks."

According to allegations in the criminal complaint, Maldonado traveled from Houston, Texas, to Africa in November 2005 and then on to Somalia on or about December 2006 to join the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) and elements of Al Qaeda, to fight "jihad" against the Transitional Federal Government to establishment of an independent Islamic State in Somalia. In the fall of 2006, the ICU used suicide bombers and vehicles containing improvised explosive devices to target the leadership of the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia.

While in Somalia, Maldonado was, according to the complaint, provided an AK-47, equipped with military combat uniforms and boots in Mogadishu, and participated in training camps in Kismaayo and Jilib, Somalia. The camps included physical fitness, firearms, and explosives training all in preparation to go to the front to fight for the ICU. Al Qaeda members were allegedly present at the training camp. During the course of his training, the complaint alleges Maldonado spoke to an individual about his willingness to become a suicide bomber if he was wounded and also observed the making and testing of bombs with the group's bomb-maker.

Conspiring to use a destructive device carries a maximum penalty of any term of years up to life imprisonment upon conviction. Receiving military training from a terrorist organization carries a maximum punishment of 10 years imprisonment upon conviction.

The investigation leading to the filing of criminal charges in this case was conducted by the Joint Terrorism Task Force including special agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and officers of the Houston Police Department. The case will be prosecuted by Assistant U. S. Attorney Gary Cobe.

A complaint is an accusation of criminal conduct, not evidence. A defendant is presumed innocent unless and until convicted through due process of law.